admin: Clarify securty policy on what is not a vulnerability (#2128)
Signed-off-by: Larry Gritz <lg@larrygritz.com>
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@@ -30,6 +30,27 @@ address critical security vulnerabilities rapidly and post patches as quickly
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as possible.
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## What do we consider a vulnerability?
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We only consider a situation to be a security vulnerability if an untrusted
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party can plausibly trigger the flaw through normal product inputs (for
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example, a maliciously crafted oso file that might compromise a renderer when
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loaded). We do not support requesting a CVE for API-only or caller-controlled
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failures with no realistic adversarial path.
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The OSL project adopts the same security stance as many other language
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compilers: we believe that shaders that will be JITed and executed are by
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definition *trusted inputs*, and should not be accepted from untrusted
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sources. A shader that causes damage when it faithfully executes is not a
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vulnerability per se. In rare circumstances, we might consider it a
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vulnerability if a maliciously crafted shader can cause the renderer or OSL
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library to do something damaging that is different from what the shader text
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implies.
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Flaws whose root cause lies in a dependency should be reported and fixed
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upstream; the upstream project owns the CVE when one is warranted.
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## Other security features
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### Signed tags
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@@ -50,3 +71,4 @@ None known
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## History of CVE Fixes
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None to date
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